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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
DEFAMATION-WRITTEN IMPUTATIONS OF INDEBTEDNESS
CONCERNING NON-TRADER HELD LIBELOUS PER SE
Defendant allegedly mailed to friends, relatives, and business associates of
the plaintiff, twelve false written charges that plaintiff had long been delinquent
in paying a small debt. Without pleading special damages, the plaintiff com-
plained that the publications were libelous per se, as tending to injure her credit
and reputation as an individual. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the Ap-
pellate Division which had reversed an order of Special Term denying a motion
by the defendant to dismiss the complaint on the ground of insufficiency. Held:
Such charges are capable of a defamatory construction and it-was a question for
the jury whether plaintiff was held up to ridicule and contempt. Cyran v. Finlay
Straits, Inc., 302 N. Y. 486, 99 N. E. 2d 298 (1951).
A false written publication is libelous per se which on its face exposes or
t-rnds to expose a person to public contempt, ridicule, disgrace or shame, Sydney v.
MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209 (1926);
or which makes a person the object of aversion, or induces an evil opinion of him
in the minds of right thinking persons, or tends to deprive him of their friendly
intercourse in socitty, or to be shunned or avoided. Katapodis v. Brooklyn Spec-
tator, Inc., 287 N. Y. 17, 38 N. E. 2d 112 (1941). See comprehensive definition
in Seelman, The Law of Libel & Slander in the State of New York, Par. 18
(1933); and Prosser, Torts Sec. 91 (1941).
The ultimate purpose of the law of defamation is to redress injury to repu-
tation. Kimmerle v. N. Y. Evening Journal Inc., 262 N. Y. 99, 186 N. E. 217
(1933). A false written imputation is either libelous per se, or libelous by ex-
trinsic fact, or it is non-libelous. Where the publication is libelous per se there
is a legal presumption of damage to reputation and special damages need not be
alleged. Balabonoff v. Hearst Consol. Publishing Co., 294 N. Y. 351, 62 N. E. 2d
599, (1945); McCormick, Damages Sec. 113 (1935). But where the publication is
libelous by reason of extrinsic facts, special damages must be alleged and proven.
O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co., 214 N. Y. 352, 108 N. E. 556 (1915).
It is universally accepted that false written charges which impute non-payment
of debts, want of credit or insolvency to a merchant or trader or one engaged in
a vocation wherein financial credit is necessary are libelous per se. Holmes v. Jones,
121 N. Y. 461, 24 N. B. 701 (1890), Brown v. Trego, 236 N. Y. 497, 142 N. E.
159 (1923). See Further 53 CJS 67; 33 Am. Jur. 78; 116 Am. St. Rep. 817,
and cases therein cited. But in a majority of States, a false written statement
that a person who is not a trader or merchant or engaged in a profession wherein
credit is necessary, owes a debt and is unwilling or refuses to pay, without imput-
ing insolvency, is not considered libelous per se. M. Rosenberg & Son v. Craft, 182
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Va. 512, 29 S. E. 2nd 375 (1944). Thus, to charge a non-trader with failure to
pay a just debt, or to list an individual on a delinquent debtors' list, or to impute
that an individual owes a debt which he refuses to pay is not libelous per se
under this rule. Holtz v. National Furniture Co., 57 F. 2d 466 (D. C. Cir. 1932);
Harrison v. Burger, 212 Ala. 670, 103 So. 842, (1925); Davis v. Gen. Finance &
Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S. E. 2d 225 (1950); Patton v. Jacobs, 118
Ind. App. 358, 78 N. E." 2d 789 (1948). However, where the imputations
go beyond charges of indebtedness or refusal to pay a debt and impute deliberate
evasion in paying a debt, or dishonesty, they are libelous per se. Cohen v. Marx
Jewelry Co., 92 F. 2d 498 (D. C. Cir. 1937), and cases therein cited.
A few States, including New York, have held that to falsely charge an indi-
vidual or non-trader with refusal or unwillingness to pay a debt is libelous per se.
In Wells v. Belstrat Hotel Corp., 212 App. Div. 366, 208 N. Y. Supp. 625 (1st
Dept. 1925) it was considered libelous per se to charge the plaintiff with failure
to pay a small hotel bill. In Keating v. Conviser, 127 Misc. 531, 217 N. Y. Supp.
117 (Sup. Ct. 1926), rev'd without opinion, 219 App. Div. 836, 220 N. Y.
Supp. 874 (2d Dept. 1927), reversal aff'd without opinion, 246 N. Y. 632, 159
N. E. 680 (1927), a letter to the plaintiff's employer charging that she was de-
linquent in paying for goods purchased on credit was held libelous per se. The
fact situation in Neaton v. Lewis Apparel Stores Inc., 267 App. Div. 728, 48 N.
Y. S. 2d 492, aff'd mem., 268 App. Div. 834, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 463 (3rd Dept.
1944), was similar to that in the instant case. The defendant had sent a letter
to the plaintiff's employer soliciting his assistance in the collection of an alleged
indebtedness. The court rejected the contention of the defendant that the charge
was not libelous per se because the plaintiff was a non-trader and had failed to
allege special damages. The majority held the publication libelous per se not
as imputing dishonesty to the plaintiff but as intended to depict him as an indi-
vidual debtor unworthy of credit. See Note, 8 TI. Detroit L J. 36 (1944). In
Sheppard v. Dun & Bradstreet Inc., 71 F. Supp. 942 (S. D. N. Y. 1947), the de-
fendant published a credit report stating that the plaintiff had failed to pay a debt
as he had agreed and that he was sued as a consequence. The court measured
the charge with the holding of the Neaton case supra and ruled that the publica-
tion was libelous per se. However, a false charge that one is in mere default on
a debt has not been held libelous per se. Douglas v. Weber, 106 Misc. 338, 174
N. Y. Supp. 486 (Sup. Ct. 1919). See Note, 3 A. L. R. 1590 (1918).
Other States in concurring with New York in this minority view have held
it libelous per se to placard a non-trader in an attempt to collect an alleged in-
debtedness by coercion, Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman, 181 Ky. 487, 205 S.
W. 558 (1918); or to impute that a non-trader is unworthy of credit or that an
individual is a delinquent debtor, Turner v. Brien, 184 Iowa* 320, 167 N. W.
584 (1918); Vail v. Pennsylvania R.R., 103 N. J. L. 213, 136 A. 425 (1927).
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Similarly, to impute that an individual is unable to meet his obligations, or that
one is the victim of abject poverty has been found libelous per se. Gross v. Need-
harn Co-Operative Bank, 312 Mass. 309, 44 N. E. 2d 690 (1942). Katapodis v.
-Brooklyn Spectator Inc., supra. See Note 3 A. L R. 1590 (1918).
The refusal of a majority of the courts to hold that charges of indebtedness
or delinquency in paying a debt are libelous per se when published concerning
a non-trader seems to proceed upon the theory that unless such imputations
reflect upon a trader or merchant who needs credit in his business, or unless the
charges can be construed to impute dishonesty or insolvency so as to impeach the
reputation of a non-trader, there can be no legal presumption of damages. The
majority theory is not espoused by the Restatement, Torts Sec. 559, Comment b
(1938):
"Communications are often defamatory because they tend to expose
another to hatred, ridicule, and contempt. A defamatory communica-
tion may tend to disparage another by reflecting unfavorably upon his
personal morality or integrity, or it may consist of imputations which,
while not affecting another's personal reputation, tend to discredit his
financial standing in the community, and this is so whether or not the
other is engaged in business or industry."
In view of the true nature of libel per se as propounded in the instant case,
the distinction made by the majority of states between the credit reputation of
traders and merchants as opposed to the individual's financial reputation repre-
sents an erroneous graft upon the law of libel per se. Moreover, the theory
upon which this distinction reposes seems to ring artificial iii the light of an
individual's credit needs and modern credit practices.
Maynard C. Schaus, Jr.
INSURANCE-FIDELITY BONDS HELD CONTINUING CONTRACT-
RECOVERY DENIED BEYOND FACE VALUE
Plaintiff was insured against losses through embezzlement by employees under
a Blanket Position Bond issued by defendant insurer; the amount of the defendant's
maximum liability as to acts of the insured's bookkeeper being stated as $5,000.
Plaintiff paid annual premiums from 1942 until 1948 when it paid an amount
equal to two and one-half times the annual premium for which the term of the
bond was extended three years. A clause in the bond stipulated: "The payment
of annual (or agreed) premiums during the term shall not render the amount of
this bond cumulative from year to year." In 1948 plaintiff discovered that its
bookkeeper had embezzled more than $5,000 during each of the years 1945, 1947
and 1948 and $3,975A7 in 1946. Plaintiff contended it should receive $18,975.47
